Some people immediately react to the idea of a far-reaching veto right for individuals by saying, “That simply must not be allowed, because it would open the door wide to abuse of power.” I would like to respond briefly: in the present case, that concern is completely irrelevant; putting it front and center rather reveals a troubling imbalance when it comes to trust and priorities. Why?
If we were talking about a large association with many members and a large board of ten or more people, I would agree. In such a context, one must reckon with abuse of power and other forms of corruption. In the case of FCA, however, we are dealing with a very small body of just three to six people—highly committed colleagues who work closely together and are in some cases friends. This raises a counter-question for me: if there is not even this basic level of trust among colleagues—that no one would intentionally abuse this rule—don’t you think the association would then have a much more fundamental problem than the veto rule itself? Even if such an abuse of power were to occur, accountability would typically be demanded swiftly at an extraordinary general meeting. That is precisely what these organizational structures are for.
In a voluntary social project, I believe one must be able to trust one’s colleagues to the extent that neither Herbert nor Susan would ever use such a powerful veto right without good reason. If you cannot trust one another even that far, why are you working together at all? Do you consider the others too unreliable to apply such an emergency rule conscientiously? Do you regard the entire association as too disorganized or sluggish to sanction such behavior appropriately? If that is the case, then why remain part of this association? Without this trust, the whole collaboration loses its meaning.
For this reason, the concern about this kind of abuse of power is not relevant here.